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INVESTMENT TRUSTS AS TRUST INVESTMENTS
EDWARD CLARK LUKENS
The development and advertising of investment trusts has
doubtless caused some trustees to consider utilizing these institu-
tions as a means of investing trust funds. Possibly few are aware
that there is any doubt as to their right to do so, in cases, where
they are not limited to so-called legal investments. The question
I raise is whether the placing of trust funds in the hands of
so-called investment trust organizations may not constitute an
illegal delegation of fiduciary powers. As there is apparently no
direct authority on the problem, the real function of this article
is to call attention to the question rather than to urge the writer's
opinion as-to the answer.
I assume a situation where the will or other document
creating the trust expressly permits the trustee to invest in securi-
ties that are not "legal investments". I am not concerned with
the question of what are legal investments, the answer to which
of course differs in the different states. I have in mind the ordi-
nary prbvision in wills, under which the trustee can properly invest
in standard issues of stocks and bonds. It is probable that in such
cases trustees often assume that they can invest in anything offered
by reputable bankers or traded in on the stock exchanges, and are
thus not on the alert for other legal objections to such invest-
ments.
It is a well established rule that a trustee cannot delegate his
powers, aside from merely ministerial duties.' It is thus clear
that a trustee could not simply hand over the fund to someone
else whom he modestly regarded as more competent to handle it
than himself. It would plainly be improper for the trustee to
'Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Zinser, 264 Ill. 31, 105 N. E. 718 (1914) ;
Cheever v. Ellis, 134 Mich. 645, 96 N. W. lO67 (1903) Dodge v. Stickney, 62
N. H. 330 (1889) ; Bohlen's Estate, 75 Pa. 304 (874); Woddrop v. Weed, 154
Pa. 307, 26 Atl. 375 (893) ; Meck v. Behrens, 141 Wash. 676, 252 Pac. 91, 50
\. L. R. 207 (1927) ; White v. Baugh, 9 Bligh N. S. 18i (1835); I PERRY,
TRUSTS AND "'1RUSIEES (7th (d. 1929) § 287.
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place trust funds in the hands of a broker under a "discretionary
account" or other arrangement by which the latter and not the
former niul,, ie decisions and controlled the cash or securities.
In the case of Aleck v. Behrens,2 individual trustees were sur-
charged and held as guarantors of the trust fund, when they had
turned it over to a trust company, this being regarded by the
court as an illegal delegation of their powers and duties.
To apply this principle to the case of investing through an
investment trust, we must consider first the nature of the transac-
tion, and second the reasons for the doctrine that fiduciary powers
cannot be delegated.
A dissertation on the various types of investment trust is
unnecessary, as their main features are well known. The ques-
tion is whether one who exchanges his cash for the shares or
obligations of such an organization is really making an invest-
ment therein, or whether he is merely turning over his cash to
the management to invest it, or speculate with it, for him. If
the investment trust, or trading company, or whatever it may be
called, may properly be regarded as an institution sui generis,
employing its own capital in its own business ventures, then its
stock would be like any other stock in which a trustee with suffi-
ciently broad powers might invest. If on the contrary, the true
view is that the investment company is a mere agency for
combining and investing the funds of its members, then a pur-
chase of its stock or other evidence of participation does not in
itself constitute an investment, but is merely a mechanical step
in the process of getting the money invested, and constitutes an
abdication of his powers by the trustee.
In the case of an unincorporated investment trust, the dele-
gation seems perfectly clear. If the manager is literally a trustee,
gives the participant a mere receipt or evidence of fractional inter-
est, and proceeds to purchase stocks or "play the market" with the
combined fund, he is certainly handling the member's money
for him, and the money is not really invested until something is
purchased by the manager. No elaboration of terminology can
'Supra note I.
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distinguish this from a mere "pool," and there can be no escape
from the conclusion that a trustee could not enter such a pool.
Even though the investments may be in the possession of a trust
company under a deed of trust limiting the management's powers,
the result would be the same. It can make no difference whether
the fiduciary delegates the possession and the discretion separately
or together, since he has no right to relinquish either.
It is difficult to see how the situation is changed by the incor-
poration of the managing body. The fact that the contribution
is received by a corporate body rather than by an individual or
group of trustees, and that the participant receives a certificate
of stock instead of some other evidence of part ownership, does
not really change the situation. It would seem that the purchase
of such stock is merely a form, and that the delegation of authority
to do the investing is still the substance.
If the stock certificate purports to certify to the direct frac-
tional ownership of the securities in the "portfolio," it is hardly
a certificate of shareholdership in the ordinary sense at all, as the
ordinary corporation shareholder's rights are based on a wholly
different conception from that of part ownership of the specific
property. But even in a case where the stock certificate is in the
ordinary form, so that it does not indicate on its face that the
holder has delegated his job of investing to the company, we have
still the more basic question whether the purpose of accumulating
the several contributions of capital was to carry on a business
with it or merely to invest it.
The supposed advantages of the investment trust are diversi-
fication and expert management. There is no objection to a trus-
tee seeking diversification, and there is no reason from this
standpoint why he should not purchase a piece of paper evidenc-
ing his ownership of a fractional interest in a stated group of in-
vestments, as in the "fixed" type of investment trust, but he would
still be delegating the possession, if not the investing, of the trust
funds. The risk might be much less serious, but it would still
be his. In the ordinary type of investment trust, expert manage-
ment is largely stressed. Management of the trust fund by others,
even if they be properly called experts, is the very thing that runs
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afoul of the delegation of discretion doctrine. If this is the
primary object and characteristic of the investment trust, its im-
propriety for trust funds is dear.
The main reason for the rule that a trustee shall not delegate
his duties is that the creator of the trust has chosen to rely upon
his personal skill and judgment.3 The testator or grantor is the
one to decide whose management is wanted, and he would not
have chosen the particular trustee had he not preferred him. The
question is not who the trustee thinks can handle it best, but
who the testator thought could handle it best. The reason for the
rule guides its application, and leaves little doubt that the duty
of the fiduciary is to function himself, however much more "ex-
pert" some other person or organization may be.
The principle that the trustee must not let another organ-
ization do his investing for him cannot be carried quite to a
logical conclusion. There are numerous business enterprises the
success of which depends largely upon the ability of the manage-
ment in the investment of the capital or surplus in the securities
of other corporations. No one would maintain that the purchase
by a trustee of bank or insurance company stocks would involve
an illegal delegation, although the value of these stocks might
depend more on choice of investments than on pure banking or
underwriting activities. The value of stock in an incorporated
brokerage house would be even more dependent on its success
in investing and trading, but the capital contributed to such a
corporation would clearly be employed in its own business activi-
ties. 4 The incorporated investment trust, however, can be placed
in this class only upon the dubious premise that trading in stocks
In Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Zinser, supra note 1, it was held that the
rule does not apply to a corporate fiduciary, since no individual judgment is
relied upon. I question the validity of this exception, beyond the situation of
the particular case, which was of a merger of two trust companies. Certainly a
man may prefer one trust company to another, and at least when he chooses a
trust company he relies upon the qualifications of such a company and expects
the trust to be handled within its organization.
" It should be noted that an investment may be improper for other reasons
than the legal investment rule and the delegation of power doctrine. A trustee
in any case must use due care and diligence, and permission to go outside the
legal investment list does not relieve him of this. A purely speculative business
might be an improper investment on this ground alone. See Pray's Appeal, 34
Pa. loo (859) ; Hart's Estate, 203 Pa. 480, 53 Atl. 364 (19o2).
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for one's own account, purely for profits and not for brokerage
commissions, can be regarded as a business enterprise in itself.
Assuming that the courts would condemn the purchase with
trust funds of securities of the pure investment trust or trading
corporation, how far would they carry the principle into the
various forms of quasi investment trusts, holding companies.
or whatever they may be called? It is here that we reach the
doubtful zone, but only because of the infinite possible variety
of hybrid financial plans.
A true holding company, the purpose of which is to provide
a centralized control over a group of corporations constituting
a single business combination, would be readily distinguishable
from an investment trust. On the other hand, an investment trust
could confine itself to the securities of a single industry and pur-
chase sufficiently large blocks of stock to obtain representation on
boards of directors, and still cause no doubt as to its real purpose
and character.
Some of the corporations recently formed by railroads, banks,
and other organizations, for the purpose of holding title to securi-
ties that the parent company for some reason does not want in its
own name, would be difficult to classify. It is perhaps sufficient
to show that there are such border line cases, without attempting
to prophesy as to just where the law will eventually draw the line.
